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Abstract
The introduction of American ideas of consumer bankruptcy in European continental civil law 
systems appears to present an opportunity to resolve some of the paradoxes of paternalism 
analysed by Ogus.1 Bankruptcy law for individuals in Europe has evolved from a neglected fi eld 
of procedural civil law, in which creditor autonomy was the prevailing norm, into a blossoming 
fi eld of social policy and consumer protection. This article sketches the history of ‘bankruptcy 
waves’ and refl ects on the possibilities of a future regulatory wave in which the lessons of the 
credit crunch have been incorporated. It concludes with some thoughts on the theme of this issue 
of the Erasmus Law Review.
1 Introduction
The tension between autonomy and paternalism in private law has a long history. In this 
article, I will present consumer bankruptcy as a hyper-modern private law institution in 
which a middle ground has been realised, at both national and European level.
 I have never believed that private law institutions are politically neutral and have 
found it rewarding to explore the political dimensions of substantive and procedural 
regulations in the fi elds of debtor-creditor law. Unlike law and economics scholars, in the 
fi eld of socio-legal studies we are not so much inclined to defi ne contractual relations in 
individual, but in social, societal and sociological terms. Furthermore, unlike Margaret 
Thatcher, we believe that there is such a thing as society, not only individuals.
 I have deliberately chosen the include the phrase ‘a third way’ in the title of this 
article, because it refers to – and is an icon of – the discussions in the 1990s about 
the renewal of social-democratic political thought.2 This makes the concept relevant 
for the juxtaposition of autonomy and paternalism in contract law. Third-way thinkers 
have tried to fi nd an ideological middle way between the dynamics of market forces 
and societal innovation, on the one hand, and a leaner welfare state that is aimed at 
activating rather than pampering its citizens, on the other.
 In 2010, we are facing the results of a big credit crunch after decades of unprecedented 
economic growth in the West, which has been fi nanced to a large extent with borrowed 
money. Now that the fi nancial system and the underlying markets have obviously 
failed to produce eternal prosperity, governments, businesses and consumers must pay 
back the debts that they previously accumulated.3 One of the battlegrounds will be the 
bankruptcy of individuals, which makes this an ideal opportunity to test autonomous and 
paternalistic assumptions that constitute private law in action. Rich Western societies 
have to devise policies to distribute the damage between creditors, debtors and society 
at large in a fair and acceptable manner.
 I have been a student of consumer credit contracts since I wrote my dissertation 
in 19814 and was involved in drafting the Dutch Consumer Credit Act (1984-1990). 
* Professor of Socio-Legal Studies, Erasmus School of Law and Leiden Law School.
1 A. Ogus, ‘The Paradoxes of Legal Paternalism and How to Resolve Them’ (2010) 30(1) Legal Studies 
61-73.
2 A. Giddens, The Third Way: The Renewal of Social Democracy (Polity Press 1998).
3 See R.A. Posner, A Failure of Capitalism: The Crisis of ‘08 and the Descent into a Depression (Harvard 
University Press 2009).
4 N. Huls, Consumer Credit, Socio-Economic Considerations, Especially in Relation to Hire Purchase 
(dissertation (in Dutch), Utrecht) (Deventer: Kluwer 1981).
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Substantive consumer credit contract law is a very timely subject in 2010, as we are 
facing pay-back time after the credit crunch. In credit law we can examine the strengths 
and weaknesses of both consensual and institutional approaches.
 When a consumer signs a consumer credit contract, he uses his future earning power 
in the present. In the credit market, the person is a free and autonomous consumer, 
but for his future income he is usually dependent on his employer. Credit contracts 
constitute long-term relationships, and this means all kinds of events may interfere in 
the normal execution of the contract (e.g. divorce, unemployment, etc.). If the debtor is 
unable to continue his payments, he has a problem with his creditor. Because credit is so 
readily available nowadays, a debtor in default normally has many creditors. If a debtor 
cannot pay his debts, there will also be a fi ght between the creditors for the debtors’ 
assets and future income. Here, procedural private law comes into play: collective debt 
enforcement often ends in bankruptcy.
 In this article, I will examine the birth and development of the consumer bankruptcy 
model that Europe has modelled after the US Bankruptcy Code.
 My starting point is a book that I published in 1994 – together with some colleagues 
– at the request of the European Commission.5 The book was an academic attempt to 
promote the combination of existing informal social practices with a new legal impetus 
from the US Bankruptcy Code, at both EU and national level.
 More recently, I have participated in the collective efforts of the Working Group on 
Consumer Bankruptcy of the Law and Society Association.6 
2 A Short Political History of Debt Enforcement
Pacta sunt servanda is the ultimate incentive for the autonomous individual to take full 
responsibility for keeping the promises he has made. As such it is a rock-solid moral, 
legal and policy principle of human coexistence.7 The binding power of agreements is 
also a vital element of our daily social life.
 In pre-modern times, not paying debts was regarded as a punishable offence. Not 
honouring personal promises was considered a morally reprehensible deed. Non-
payment of debt was primarily an offence against the contractual party, but it was also 
a social evil that lent itself well to a public response. Cruel practices (e.g. drawing 
and quartering or the stocks), forms of slavery (e.g. peonage or forced labour) and 
incarceration (debtors’ prison) were the severe responses by which society and the legal 
system traditionally expressed their abhorrence.8 Therefore, bankruptcy has a long and 
depressing9 tradition of retribution.
 A fi rst breakthrough occurred when capitalism began to develop and industrial 
production methods became increasingly large-scale. Commercial transactions became 
larger and riskier, which meant that private entrepreneurs/owners were no longer willing 
to guarantee their companies’ obligations. The legal answer to this need for restricting 
liability was the legal person (rechtspersoon). If an entrepreneur did not want to be 
liable in person, his company’s debts were borne by a legal construct. The societal gain 
attached to the entrepreneurial spirit and risk-taking were considered to be greater than 
that of bearing personal liability for debts. The idea behind this legal construct was that 
5 N. Huls et al., Overindebtedness of Consumers in the EC Member States: Facts and Search for 
Solutions, Collection Droit et Consommation No. 29 (Diegen, Belgium: Story Scientia 1994).
6 J. Niemi-Kiesliainen, W.C. Whitford and I. Ramsay (eds.), Consumer Bankruptcy in Global Perspective 
(Oxford/Portland, Oregon: Hart 2003); and J. Niemi, I. Ramsay and W.C. Whitford (eds.), Consumer 
Credit, Debt and Bankruptcy: Comparative and International Perspectives (Hart 2009).
7 H. Arendt, The Human Condition (University of Chicago Press 1958). See, in particular, the fi nal 
sections of Part V.
8 J.H. Dalhuisen, Compositions in Bankruptcy: A Comparative Study of the Law of the EC Countries, 
England and the USA (doctoral dissertation, Amsterdam 1968).
9 ‘Bankruptcy is a gloomy and depressing subject’ is the famous opening phrase of Charles Warren’s 
History of Bankruptcy Law (Harvard University Press 1935).
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society as a whole benefi ted from the legal protection of adventurous entrepreneurs. 
This limitation of the entrepreneur’s liability was not considered to be paternalistic at 
all!
 A second development was the need for bankruptcy as a collection tool against small 
entrepreneurs. This legal instrument is of particular importance in preventing individual 
creditors of a company in fi nancial diffi culties from jumping the queue and causing 
a damaging mutual struggle entailing signifi cant social costs. Because bankruptcy is 
also a confl ict between creditors inter se, the law traditionally recognises the fi gure of 
an independent administrator (trustee), who is responsible for the optimal and honest 
settlement of the claims, or an honest distribution of the losses, in order to prevent 
the bankruptcy degenerating into a situation in which the debtor is ‘robbing Peter to 
pay Paul’. This is a classic collective action problem10 that creditors themselves cannot 
resolve, given their confl icting individual interests. Government intervention in this 
multi-party constellation is necessary, without a need for paternalistic justifi cation. 
Creditor autonomy does not do much good when the insolvent debtor has many creditors.
 In contrast to the commercial world, bankruptcy law for individuals long remained 
an underdeveloped area. This legal fi eld only really gained importance in the 1960s 
when Western economies developed into full-blown consumer societies, where credit 
began to play an increasing role. Credit was regarded as an important positive engine for 
economic growth. The moral objections to ‘live now, pay later’ faded into the background 
when big bona fi de fi nancial institutions began providing large-scale credit to broad 
swathes of the population. Initially the focus was on installment payments, credit linked 
to specifi c purchases, but later loans and revolving credit came to prominence: credit the 
consumer could utilise freely.
 Once consumer credit reached full maturity virtually everywhere in rich Western 
European countries, the interest in consumer bankruptcy along American lines arose 
of itself.11 In America, the limited liability of the consumer in bankruptcy functioned 
as a social safety net for which the Europeans had welfare state provisions. American 
concepts like ‘discharge of debts’ and the ‘fresh start’ policy appealed to European policy-
makers for various reasons. It fi tted well in a period of deregulation and privatisation, 
where state interference was regarded, in the famous words of Ronald Reagan ‘not as 
the solution, but as the problem’. European politicians wanted to slim down the bloated 
welfare state, and a debt clean-up law sat well within liberal thinking. It was after all a 
type of social policy for which the politicians could receive credit, while passing the bill 
to the creditors.
 Furthermore, the American legal concepts fi tted well in Europe’s zeitgeist of the 1990s. 
The overindebted consumer was no longer regarded as a deviant who readily became 
dependent on the state but as someone who has taken too much risk on the fi nancial 
markets. Entrepreneurial risk-taking was then part of the new ideal of citizenship in civil 
society. In that same period, the OECD criticised European governments12 for the fact 
that their harsh bankruptcy laws made small entrepreneurs risk-averse to setting up new 
businesses, and they became a target group for the new bankruptcy legislation.
 In sum, the political message of the 1990s was: protection of debtors against creditors 
yields big societal benefi ts, and the transformation of old-fashioned procedural private 
law is a good mechanism for gaining these benefi ts.
10 M. Olson, The Logic of Collective Action. Public Goods and the Theory of Goods (Harvard University 
Press 1965).
11 See G. Hörmann (ed.), Consumer Credit and Consumer Insolvency: Perspectives for Legal Policy 
from Europe and the USA (ZERP/Bremen University Press 1986); M. Balz, ‘Insolvenzverfahren für 
Verbraucher?’ (1986) Zeitschrift für Rechtspolitik 12 ff..
12 For example, OECD, Reviews of National Science and Technology Policies: The Netherlands (1986).
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3 Historical and Comparative Analysis of ‘Waves’ of Bankruptcy 
Regulation13
Historically, there are four periods of more or less intense activity by legislators in 
developing bankruptcy law.
3.1 The First Wave: Fair Distribution of Property
The fi rst regulations were derived from the French Commercial Code of 1806. The 
French regulated the distribution of the property of merchants in favour of their creditors 
through a form of creditor self-regulation. The French code mandated the tribunal de 
commerce (lay institutions) to proceed in bankruptcy cases.
 The second step in the regulation of bankruptcy occurred at the end of the nineteenth 
century and took place not only in continental Europe but also in England and America. 
Bankruptcy had become particularly important against the background of the industrial 
revolution in continental Europe. In 1877, Germany passed a more general bankruptcy 
code that incorporated merchants and companies but, signifi cantly, did not exclude 
individual debtors. Similar legislation was adopted elsewhere in Europe. The US 
Bankruptcy Act was passed by the US Congress in 1898.
 This late nineteenth century law was based on the idea that bankruptcy should help 
creditors to recover as much as possible of the debt owed to them from the commercial 
debtor’s assets. In fact, under the Greek, French and Belgian bankruptcy schemes, only 
merchants and companies can be declared bankrupt. Other schemes, like the Spanish, 
British and German ones, distinguish between companies and individuals. Although 
they do not expressly exclude the individual’s debtor whose indebtedness does not arise 
from commercial activity, the design of these bankruptcy codes shows a clear leaning 
towards commercial debts.
 At the heart of the bankruptcy procedures is the property of the debtor. Without 
property there is no bankruptcy. In most bankruptcy schemes, the interests of the 
creditors are paramount. The distribution of the debtor’s property is consequently the 
main purpose of continental bankruptcy legislation. The discharge of debts and the 
protection of debtors is not its primary focus.
3.2 The Second Wave: Restructuring 
The second wave of reforms in bankruptcy legislation came at a time when the world 
economic crisis of the 1920s and 1930s highlighted the problems of over-indebted 
companies and merchants whose economic survival was seen as valuable for the 
whole economy. Rescue plans and state support for weak enterprises in order to save 
jobs brought a whole new philosophy: that one should not only consider the interests 
of creditors in recovering outstanding debts but also give assistance and support to 
overcommitted debtors. The US Chandler Act of 1938 introduced bankruptcy procedures 
that were intended to provide an alternative settlement that would facilitate the survival 
of bankrupt enterprises. The rights of the creditors were not challenged, but measures 
intended to bring about an equitable settlement were proposed. These measures included 
the suspension of payments during the ‘bankruptcy’ procedure, which gave the debtors 
relief so that they could seek such settlements. The American division between chapters 
7 and 13 of the Bankruptcy Code characterised the new dualism in bankruptcy law.
 The suspension of payment rules required the consent of the creditors before they 
could be applied. This approach lacked some of the traditional stigma attached to 
bankruptcy, but the infl uence of the second wave in bankruptcy law on the real economy 
was not very large.
13 This paragraph is based on Udo Reifner’s analysis in chapter 6 of Huls et al., above n. 5.
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3.3 The Third Wave: Emergence of Debtor’s Protection in Bankruptcy Law
While the second wave of reforms in bankruptcy law can be located quite precisely 
in time (the Great Crash of 1929), the development of exemption laws to protect the 
standards of living of the debtor (the third wave) were mostly introduced into civil 
codes as general principles of protection against garnishment of wages and seizure of 
property.
 The primary objective was to guarantee the physical survival of the debtor, and thus 
to limit the social welfare spending of the state, on the one hand, while trying to ensure 
that the debtor was still able to earn a living, on the other. The law lists the items that are 
exempt from garnishment. Most bankruptcy laws make reference to these exemption 
laws.
3.4 The Fourth Wave: Reregulating Insolvency (1980s)
While bankruptcy laws increasingly regulated the ways in which the insolvency of the 
debtor was dealt with instead of simply enforcing the creditors’ claims, a new breed 
of creditors, in particular the banks, devised new means of debt enforcement that 
rendered bankruptcy steadily less effi cient. The banks developed their own forms of 
insolvency regulation through reservation of property, leasing, wage assignments and 
pre-authorised rights to auction real estate.
 In the early 1960s, studies showed that bankruptcy procedures had become ineffi cient. 
As a result most practical insolvency measures had developed outside traditional legal 
procedures.
 Coinciding with the demise of traditional bankruptcy philosophy, there was trade 
union pressure to rescue important industries. This pressure pushed the idea of general 
bankruptcy reform. In the 1980s, nearly all EEC countries worked on proposals to revise 
their regulations on the insolvency of debtors. The shift from bankruptcy to insolvency 
regulation was also visible in the new categories of debtors in the bankruptcy laws.
 While the bankruptcy reforms in all countries refl ected some shift in emphasis 
from protecting the creditors’ interests to protecting the debtor, bankruptcy regulation 
still essentially remained a market-based solution. It was a response to problems that 
had arisen much earlier and an attempt to impose a legal framework on what was an 
economic development. The insight that debt problems and insolvency do not require 
the protection of creditors so much as that of debtors led to a paradigm shift that focused 
on making bankruptcy procedures fi t for the idea of consumer protection. During this 
period, the consumer credit revolution was taking place.
 Problems of new poverty, over-indebtedness and lifelong dependence on banks and 
other creditors made it obvious that social protection laws targeting seizure of property, 
wage garnishment and other forms of debt enforcement were no longer adequate in 
modern consumption societies.
 The traditional bankruptcy schemes did not allow ordinary people access to a fresh 
start. The reasons were as follows:
 - Insolvency procedures for merchants and companies were designed to be 
self-fi nancing procedures. They presupposed some minimum level of assets 
owned by the debtor and therefore barred from insolvency procedures 
those people who had nothing to sell apart from their labour.
 - Insolvency procedures for commercial organisations were intended to 
achieve the distribution of property to the creditors or the restructuring of 
the company’s assets. Over-committed private debtors, however, did not 
generally have any seizable property.
 - Bankruptcy legislation was much too complicated for consumer problems.
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3.5 The Post-1990 Paradigm of Consumer Bankruptcy in Europe
The laws that were developed in this period have many common elements, namely:
 - all countries agreed that their traditional bankruptcy legislation did not 
meet the needs of individual debtors;
 - nearly all procedures restrict access for individuals in non-commercial 
activity, even though it is acknowledged that individual debtors may have 
old commercial debts;
 - all procedures can only be instigated by the debtor;
 - all procedures include the future earnings of the debtor;
 - all procedures allow for discharge from those debts that are included in the 
plan and will not be paid off within their given time limit;
 - all schemes make provision to exclude those who abuse the scheme;
 - the procedures have little or no costs attached to them and are specially 
designed to allow access for poor people.
The intellectual underpinning of modern insolvency law was laid down in the Cork 
Report.14 There are three parties: the debtor, the creditor and society. Society is 
concerned with relieving and protecting the individual insolvent from the harassment 
of creditors and enabling the individual to regain fi nancial stability and have a new 
chance. It accords the insolvent this relief in return for contributions, not only from his 
(non-exempt) assets but also from his future earnings, as can reasonably be made by 
him without reducing him and his family to undue and socially unacceptable poverty 
and without depriving him of the incentive to succeed in this new chance.
 This led to the following principles:
 - To recognise that we are living in a society based on credit, which has 
brought us great prosperity. This requires, as a necessary result, proceedings 
to remedy the accidents of the credit society.
 - To diagnose and treat imminent insolvency at an early stage rather than at 
a late stage.
 - To protect the debtor and his family from undue demands and harassment 
by their creditors and, at the same time, to have regard for the rights of the 
creditor, whose position can also be threatened.
 - To prevent confl icts between individual creditors through a fair distribution 
of the proceeds among all creditors.
 - To sell the non-exempt assets of the insolvent, which should properly be 
taken to satisfy his debts, with the minimum of delay and expense.
 - To establish and encourage professional and independent debt-counselling.
 - To determine the causes of over-indebtedness and to take suitable measures 
if fraudulent behaviour is found.
 - To guarantee the public interest that is at stake in cases of insolvency.
 - To lower the unproductive costs of ineffective debt-collection.
4 Where Autonomy and Paternalism Meet: US Consumer Bankruptcy
The US Bankruptcy Code makes it very easy for debtors in the most capitalistic and 
materialistic country on earth to free themselves of their debts. In the 1980s, the American 
14 Insolvency Law and Practice, Report of the Review Committee (HMSO June 1982).
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‘fresh start’ policy inspired many European countries to transform their bankruptcy 
laws from a collection mechanism serving creditors into a social policy instrument that 
offered debtors in fi nancial diffi culty the opportunity of a new perspective.
 The US Bankruptcy Code has its own very typical American ‘wild west’ history: the 
struggle between bonded labour and peonage, the Supreme Court ruling in Local Loan 
Company v. Hunt (1934), states that offer generous exemptions to become an attractive 
base for immigrants and, last but not least, the fact that bankruptcy is included in the 
Constitution, which gives the federal government the authority to act as a regulator in 
this private law area.15
 What particular aspects of the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978 made it so attractive 
for European countries, which had completely different legal culture, to remodel their 
laws?
 I believe that the most inspiring aspect of the ‘fresh start’ policy is its future-oriented 
perspective. While traditional European bankruptcy laws put the emphasis on the blame 
of the debtor in the past, when he incurred his debt, US law looks to the future. How 
can the debtor be put back on his feet, how can he regain a perspective on life and, most 
pragmatically, how can he be turned once again into a productive taxpayer? In other 
words, how can his life be prevented from becoming ‘a walking debtors prison’ and how 
can he regain his autonomy?
 Financial risk-taking and its associated entrepreneurial spirit is regarded positively 
in the US The stories of successful entrepreneurs whose fi rst companies went bankrupt 
are well known. A bankruptcy in the US is a chapter in someone’s life that should be 
closed as quickly as possible, so that he can move on.
 In the US, bankruptcy has the effect of a social safety net for a number of events in the 
lives of citizens that in Europe are covered by social welfare provisions: unemployment, 
illness, hospital admission and so forth. As a result of events beyond his control, a 
consumer can end up in fi nancial diffi culty. If he does not have the perspective of a better 
future, this could tempt him into dishonest behaviour, which is socially undesirable. In 
the US, this system is fi nanced not by taxpayers’ money but by creditors.
 It also sits uncomfortably with American regulatory culture to have the government 
impose restrictions on credit provision. This is regarded as politically undesirable 
intervention in corporate decisions of the banks, on the one hand, and as an infringement 
of the freedom of the consumer, on the other. Credit was and continues to be regarded 
as a positive engine driving economic growth. Concepts such as improvident credit-
granting and usury rates can count on little sympathy, because their effect is to exclude 
poor people from credit. There are, of course, some concerns about excessive credit-
granting, but the problems that arise from this can best be resolved by the self-regulating 
powers of the market and liberal bankruptcy law.
 It should not go unreported that the fi nancial services industry has lobbied for 
years against some very liberal components of the BRA (Bankruptcy Reform Act). An 
important criticism was that the consumer’s choice between chapter 7 (liquidation) and 
chapter 13 (the repayment plan) provokes strategic behaviour. For a debtor without 
income but with assets, it is very attractive to opt for chapter 13, while a debtor without 
assets and with a regular income gains by opting for chapter 7. In both cases, the debtor 
gets a cheap discharge of debts at the expense of his creditors. The fi nancial services 
industry lobby has succeeded twice. In 1984, a substantial abuse clause restricting free 
choice between chapter 7 and chapter 13 was added to the law. In 2005, the fi nancial 
services industry was again successful in its frontal attack on the misuse of the bankruptcy 
regulations by consumers, resulting in the Bankruptcy Abuse Protection and Consumer 
Protection Act (BAPCPA) 2005.
15 From D.T. Stanley and M. Girth, Bankruptcy. Problems, Process, Reform (Brookings Institute 1971) to 
E. Warren, J.L. Westbrook and T.A. Sullivan, The Fragile Middle Class: Americans in Debt (New Haven: 
Yale University Press 2000).
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4.1 Differences and Similarities between the US and Europe
There are considerable differences in the legal cultures of the US and the countries of 
north-western Europe. This has to do with the fact that countries adhering to the civil 
law tradition have something like an ‘ordre public’,16 a facet of a state that aspires 
towards what is good for the collective as a whole and a legal order that is perceived as 
‘just’ by the people.
 Another major difference is that when Americans hear the word solidarity, they 
quickly place their hands on their wallets, afraid as they are of tax increases. In Europe, 
it goes without saying that certain risks will be carried collectively and fi nanced from 
the public purse, while in the US these risks are dealt with in the private insurance 
market.17
 However, there are similarities as well. Credit in Europe is now totally democratised: 
all segments of the population make extensive use of it. The expression ‘living beyond 
one’s means’ has lost its pejorative connotation. In modern capitalism, extending credit 
to consumers has been depersonalised to a high degree. In other words, it is based on 
technologically advanced credit scoring and assessment techniques.
 Boundaries were also shifted in the investment market. Investors without collateral 
were also able to benefi t from the rising stock and house prices. One of the many 
innovations in the fi nancial markets was investing with borrowed money.
 Since the 1990s, the various fi nancial markets in Europe are no longer separated. 
Politicians expressed their approval for the fact that banks and insurers merged and 
that fi nancial institutions began operating in each others’ turf. In a very short period, an 
integrated global market for fi nancial services had come into being. Saving, investing, 
insuring, lending, asset management and payments were no longer separate markets but 
were melding into each other. The advent of the internet meant that distance and time 
differences very quickly ceased to play a role in international exchanges. Huge sums of 
money fl ashed around the world in an instant, seeking the highest return. The fi nancial 
vanguard consisted of gigantic multinationals and huge professional investors doing 
business worldwide. All manner of new and complex fi nancial products were developed 
which also further transcended the traditional boundaries.
4.2 The Politics of Autonomy and Paternalism
Radical market thinking dominated political, economic and legal discussions in the 
1990s. The ‘system’ provided unbroken economic growth, and because there had been 
no other ideological alternative since the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989, free-market 
capitalism developed into the dominant global perspective.
 The past few decades in Europe were characterised by the celebration of the 
autonomy and self-regulation by the market. Anyone arguing for protection of debtors, 
prudent banking or limits on risk acceptance by fi nancial institutions was not only seen 
as paternalist but also demonstrated a lack of knowledge in terms of keeping up with the 
speed of fi nancial innovation. The advanced mathematics of calculating and estimating 
risk margins (computational fi nance) created its own world, with its own mandarin 
language that was only comprehensible to very specifi cally trained insiders (quants).18 
The burden of proof for the usefulness or necessity of government intervention was on 
the paternalists.
 In this period, critical questions about the desirability of teaser rates, payment 
protections insurance and stock trading with borrowed money in the consumer arena 
were all dismissed. In the period before 2007, pleas for consumer protection were 
16 See Ogus, above n. 1, at 65 and Wagner in this issue. See also M. Garcia Villega, ‘Comparative 
Sociology of Law, Legal Fields, Legal Scholarship and Social Science in Europe and the United States’ 
(2006) 31 Law and Social Inquiry 2, also published in French in (2009) L’Année sociologique 29-62, at 50. 
Peter Gabel once observed that ‘European lawyers always have the fog of the State in their heads’.
17 See the contribution of Schwarcz in this issue
18 W.H. Buiter, ‘Lessons from the Global Credit Crisis for Social Democrats’, Den Uyl lecture (December 
2008).
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regarded as hard paternalism: a wish to deny the common man the benefi ts which the 
free capital market or the stock market also holds in store for him. The consumer was 
considered to be perfectly capable of deciding for himself (autonomously) whether a 
transaction was too risky.
 The rhetoric of the proponents of consumer bankruptcy emphasised the autonomous 
core: private law provides the consumer – the sovereign ruler of the market – with a 
mechanism to deal with his many selfi sh creditors. Because they grant credit so easily, 
it is fair that creditors are forced to share the burden of over-indebted consumers. Debt 
enforcement and its consequences are never left entirely to the autonomy and contract 
freedom of the parties involved. State involvement is necessary and desirable to achieve 
acceptable outcomes. In the modern credit society, consumer bankruptcy is not only 
a problem for the debtor-creditor relationship at the individual level but also for the 
relationships between the various creditors.
5 The Conventional Wisdom after the Credit Crunch
Nowadays, for the fi rst time in ages, the American way of life, including living on credit, 
is regarded as a problem in an economic sense. Because of the high risks involved, 
lending to consumers who could not repay was an extremely profi table activity. The 
risky packages in which the subprime loans were cut up and securitised could be used 
in the short term to speculate on international stock markets.
 When it became apparent in 2007 that a lot of toxic fi nancial products had been 
put on the market, because the value of the homes under the mortgages had dropped, 
the worldwide fi nancial bastion collapsed. From that moment onwards, the issue was 
no longer how to share the profi ts but how to shift and recoup the losses. The happy 
consumer, who had sensed profi t as an investor, became an angry debtor who felt 
betrayed when confronted with his losses. Suddenly, the success stories dried up and 
the search for (or pursuit of) scapegoats was in full cry. The anger of the public at large 
was directed at the bonuses of the bankers and the laxity of the regulators.
 Because the various barriers that were intended to restrict fi nancial market forces 
had been removed, a complicated global fi nancial system, over which regulators had 
very little control, had come about in a fairly short time. The massive use of credit and 
debts in the corporate world was an important component of capitalism’s success story 
in the 1980s and 1990s, because of the leverage effect. As long as economic growth 
persisted, the developments were characterised as the intended product of fi nancial and 
technological innovation. When the fi nancial system imploded, the excess leverage 
effect was fi ngered as one of the most important causes.
 The fi nancial crisis struck in 2007 in the US, when it appeared that the risks that 
the banks had taken using highly complicated fi nancial constructions were ultimately 
insuffi ciently covered by the value of the properties on which mortgages had been 
issued and the repayment capacity of the debtors to whom the loans had been issued.
 The government had to step in at this point, because some fi nancial institutions were 
‘too big to fail’. The bankruptcy of big banks and insurance companies was not seen as 
a viable or acceptable political option, neither in the US nor in Europe. This was a clear 
example of market failure: big fi nancial institutions could not take care of themselves 
but needed government help. The giants of fi nancial capitalism were kept afl oat with 
public money. The masters of the universe19 needed the help of governments, which 
suddenly found themselves in the totally unexpected role of (temporary) owner of 
nationalised major banks.
 A particular curiosity relating to the recent credit crisis is that some of the problems 
that, according to the law and economics literature, lead to dishonesty on the consumer 
side (e.g. information asymmetry and moral hazard) can now be identifi ed just as clearly 
on the creditor side.
19 So well portrayed by Tom Wolfe in his novel Bonfi res of the Vanities (New York: Farrar Straus and 
Giroux 1987).
16 NICK HULS 
 The fi nancial industry has designed products that made the economic rationale of 
the transaction expressly misleading. Contracts were explicitly aimed at providing the 
consumer with insuffi cient information about its advantages and disadvantages. This is 
apparent from such terms as investment insurance, stock lease, repayment protection 
and so forth. The way in which costs are passed on to the consumer, for example with 
credit cards and usury policies, also excels in deliberately created vagueness. Because 
only the creditors have access to knowledge and information from the specialist 
whiz kids (quants), there is an information asymmetry in their favour. The fi nancial 
industry cannot apportion responsibility for this to middlemen, regulators or consumers. 
Complexity and vagueness aimed at misleading and cheating consumers were at the 
core of the fi nancial industry’s earning model.
 Another pillar of economic wisdom has been devastated as well. We have always 
been taught that no rational banker would lend money to people who cannot repay their 
debts. The subprime market has shown that it is extremely profi table to sell fi nancial 
products to poor people. Bankers seduced consumers with teaser rates, divided these 
high-risk loans in credit default swaps, etc., securitised them and sold them on the stock 
market. When the creditor eventually sold his part in these complex products in time, 
he obtained large profi ts. After a while, the losses were passed on to the creditors at the 
end of the transaction line and the debtors who faced high interest rates after the teaser 
period had passed. The short and unhappy story of subprime market practices is an 
indication that unfettered market forces are profi table for some but ruinous for many 
others. We can only hope that this experience will be in the minds of the lawmakers who 
are now designing policies to clean up the mess.
 When some major fi nancial institutions appeared to be ‘too big to fail’, i.e. too big 
for bankruptcy, the moral hazard problem was also brought clearly into focus.20 Were 
the banks able to take such substantial risks because they knew that at the end of the 
day the state would come to their rescue? Whatever the case, the concept of prudent 
credit provision, in other words a bank that only lends money to those who can repay it, 
became an old-fashioned and outmoded idea.
 Following the credit crunch and the election of Barack Obama as US president, 
liberals in America wonder whether, in the new political climate, the burden of proof 
may be shifted to the fi nancial institutions, now that the consequences of the credit crisis 
are becoming clear and considerable damage has been infl icted. The costs and benefi ts 
have not been divided equitably between Wall Street and Main Street.
 How will the damage that has been caused be settled? Does casum sentit dominus 
apply here, or will angry taxpayers force politicians to translate their rage into (collective) 
legal and fi nancial claims?
 Some people believed that the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989 marked the end of 
Marxism; others wonder whether the credit crunch of 2007 signalled the end of 
ideological marketism.
6 Paternalism with a Father
Once the largest consequences of the credit crunch are behind us, normal commercial 
credit provision will quickly manifest itself again. Not only the commercial entities 
selling products in the real economy but also the state will attempt to persuade citizens to 
borrow money as an alternative to collective subsidies (e.g. for education). This means 
that the number of creditors with which the consumer will enter into credit relationships 
will certainly not diminish drastically in the near future.
 On the consumer side, too, the consequences of the credit crunch will soon become 
tangible. Some people will lose their jobs or part of their pension benefi ts; others will 
need to take on fresh debts in order to maintain their standard of living or refi nance their 
loans.
20 See Buiter, above n. 18, at 17; and the Posner Becker blog at the website of the University of Chicago 
Law School.
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 For creditors, unsuccessful contracts are part of the cost of doing business in terms 
of granting consumer credit. Irrecoverable loans are sold on the commercial market to 
process servers or collection agencies, which in turn have a direct interest in dynamic 
collection. This sector is undergoing both increased professionalisation and signifi cant 
hardening. The market is dominated by large commercial companies.
 Additionally, non-paying debtors are listed with the credit registration agency, 
causing diffi culties for them when it comes to obtaining future credit. Credit reference 
in Europe was initially set up as a neutral instrument to combat excess credit, but the 
market for credit information has rapidly commercialised. Hopefully, some lessons may 
be drawn from the history of the credit rating agencies in the commercial fi nancial 
markets.
 All things considered, I expect fi nancial stress for consumers to increase. More 
creditors will jostle consumers who can no longer meet their obligations. Various classic 
political questions accordingly arise: who gets what, when and how?21 Commercial 
creditors try to circumvent bankruptcy via secured debts (mortgages!) and governmental 
bodies try to create privileged legal claims for themselves (e.g. taxation, social security 
and fi nes). On the other hand, there will (and must) always be exceptions to the possibility 
of granting the consumer a fresh start if he has not behaved in a morally responsible 
manner.
 In the remaining part of this section, I will formulate some ideas for future regulation 
in the fi eld of consumer credit and debt. My examples are taken from Dutch practice, 
but they may be of interest to foreign observers as well.
6.1 Strict Supervision
It has become clear that supervision in the fi nancial world did not keep up with the 
developments in the market. This lack of equilibrium must be repaired. Professional 
fi nancial institutions need a licence, which should form the basis of supervision by the 
state. Among other things, the law stipulates responsible credit provision. This can be 
linked to the norms that the bona fi de sector has itself developed within the context of 
self-regulation. Apart from restrictions on abuse clauses in contracts22 and advertising, a 
maximum interest rate is a good way to regulate responsible credit provision.
 Because the fi nancial markets (credit, insurance, savings, investment, etc.) were 
steadily converging as a consequence of liberalisation and deregulation, the regulatory 
system needed an update. In the Netherlands, the Dutch Central Bank (DNB) was 
responsible for prudential supervision and the Financial Markets Authority (AFM) for 
the behaviour of fi nancial institutions. It took quite a while before the two regulators 
became mutually attuned. For a long time, new products like stock leasing (a combined 
loan and an investment vehicle) were not monitored by either regulator. The credit 
crunch revealed that Dutch supervision of the fi nancial markets was also not functioning 
properly. This lax supervision might aptly be called paternalism without a father.
 What we need for the future is a supervisor who is present in the market and prevents 
banks from bringing toxic products on the market again. In 1994, Norbert Reich23 already 
framed credit as an ‘unsafe product’ in order to fi nd a legal basis for his Draft Consumer 
Financial Services Marketing Directive. The Commission was not at all enthusiastic 
about this approach to the problem.
 In the US, Oren Bar-Gill and Elisabeth Warren24 have argued for ex ante regulation 
of complicated fi nancial products by a fi nancial product safety commission. The Obama 
administration has translated their ideas into the Consumer Financial Protection Agency 
Act of 2009. The reception accorded to these proposals by the fi nancial lobby shows 
how extremely politicised economic relations are in the US The proposed interventions 
21 H.D. Laswell, Politics: Who Gets What, When, How (New York: Peter Smith 1936).
22 Even in the US, see the CARD legislation (Credit Card Accountability, Responsibility and Disclosure 
Act) that came into effect on 22 February 2010.
23 In Huls et al., above n. 5, at chapter 11.
24 O. Bar Gil and E. Warren, ‘Making Credit Safer’ (2008) 157 University of Pennsylvania Law Review 
101 ff.
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immediately conjured up the bogeyman of the all-powerful state that knows better than 
the citizens themselves. In this case, state intervention is not framed as paternalism but 
as maternalism: ‘Big Nanny’.25
 In this ideological context, the need for independent empirical research is obvious, 
because the creditors have an enormous informational advantage.26
 I believe that credit is indeed a dangerous product if it is not regulated adequately. 
We should not base our policies on abstract economic and legal models alone, but focus 
more on concrete social human needs and societal processes. With a wise combination 
of pre-market approval of new products by a supervisor, combined with solid maximum 
interest rates, the state can regain some of its authority in this fi eld.
6.2 Inclusion of Intermediaries
A second target group of regulation in the credit fi eld are the intermediaries. It has 
long been known that intermediaries and sellers play a signifi cant role in the creation 
of excess credit. Intermediaries are only interested in their own commission and can 
exercise considerable pressure on banks to accept poor credit risks, for example by 
offering them as part of a package deal with a number of good applicants.
 In the past, the Dutch government has attempted to set upper limits on payments to 
intermediaries by credit providers and link them to consumer repayment, but these rules 
were circumvented to a considerable degree and were later withdrawn in the context of 
deregulation. This mistake should be addressed in the coming years.
7 Nudging27 Collective Mechanisms in Private Law
Supervision by the state is classic paternalistic intervention. However, the state can 
also nudge the consumer side by means of indirect interventions that create more space 
for autonomous societal developments. Two Dutch practices in the context of modern 
consumer protection are worth mentioning here.
7.1 Collective Claims28
An important recent Dutch legal innovation is the Act on the Collective Settlement of 
Mass Claims (WCAM), on the basis of which a court can declare as binding a settlement 
that has come about following a collective action. The new law was fi rst applied in an 
exceptionally large collective action in the Legio Lease affair. Some 400,000 consumers 
had bought shares with borrowed money, which turned out to be loss-making when share 
prices dropped after 1 January 2000 and interest tax deductions for consumer credit were 
halted. Dexia, a Franco-Belgian multinational, was forced into a settlement following a 
professionally constituted class action. This updating of Dutch tort law could contribute 
substantially to the (collective) autonomy of the consumer over a professional opponent 
who has offered hybrid fi nancial products to inexperienced investors in a misleading, 
aggressive and non-transparent manner.
 This initial campaign was developed and directed by two law fi rms in The Hague. 
They sought a professional collaboration with the mass media and the political world 
(spin doctors) and made inventive use of the opportunities offered by the internet to 
communicate with tens of thousands of clients simultaneously.
25 D.S. Evans and J.D. Wright, ‘The Effect of the Consumer Protection Agency Act of 2009 on Consumer 
Credit’, George Mason University Law and Economics Research Paper Series No. 09-50.
26 See E. Warren, ‘The Market for Data: The Changing Role of the Social Sciences in Shaping the Law’ 
(2002) 1 Wisconsin Law Review 20-25.
27 See Richard H. Thaler & Cass R. Sunstein, Nudge. Improving decisions about health, wealth and 
happiness, New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 2008.
28 See W.H. van Boom, ‘Collective Mass Claims in the Netherlands’, in M. Casper. et al. (eds.), Auf dem 
Weg zu einer Europäischen Sammelklage? (Munich: Sellier 2009) 171-192.
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 Just as employees are able to enforce certain improvements through unionisation, 
here we have an exceptionally powerful type of collectivisation in private law, which is 
able to develop a momentum to which huge and powerful fi nancial institutions have to 
respond.
7.2 Collective Bargaining of Consumer Contracts
A second, more harmonious type of collectivisation is negotiation between consumer 
organisations and central business organisations about general legal provisions governing 
consumer transactions. Led by independent chairmen and under the auspices of the 
Social Economic Council (SER), the standard bearer of the Dutch polder model (i.e. 
consociational politics),29 general terms and conditions are being created in a number of 
important sectors and are being thoroughly tested by consumer organisations. The SER 
hallmark engenders confi dence in consumers that the legal provisions in the contracts 
are in order. This mechanism has not yet been fully implemented in the fi eld of credit 
and debt.
8 The Ethics of Consumer Bankruptcy
How can we encourage all autonomous market participants to conduct themselves in a 
morally responsible fashion?
 I think strict supervision is necessary to keep the fi nancial world in good ethical 
shape. A robust combination of extensive truth in lending regulation and an aggressive 
fi ght against abusive practices is already on the political agenda. We need the law to 
tame the predators among the creditors and to put the interests of consumers fi rst.30
 However, there are also moral ambiguities on the consumer side. Hans Boutellier has 
carried out an interesting analysis of the mindset of the modern citizen.31 He suggests 
that the modern citizen wants ‘safe freedom’. Because of the increased vitality that is 
propagated in current culture, the modern citizen wants to explore the world, take risks 
and run his own life without borders. He hates being patronised by the state, particularly 
when it comes to his consumer freedom. The citizen wants as few rules as possible that 
might restrict his own behaviour. However, if another citizen or an organisation causes 
him loss or restricts his freedom, he invokes the help of the government, because he 
wants to claim damages and also wants the existing rules to be applied rigorously to the 
other party.
 I believe Boutellier’s analysis paints a keen picture of how the consumer behaves 
in the market for fi nancial services. In times of economic prosperity and growth, and if 
interest rates are low and the prices of shares and houses rise, no-one needs a cautioning 
state that preaches restraint or sings the praises of saving. The sovereign consumer can 
decide this for himself and does not want to listen to warnings.32
 However, if the economic tide turns, interest rates rise and the underlying asset values 
drop, and loans must be repaid, the citizen suddenly looks very critically towards the 
state. Why are the savers (the rich) protected by a deposit system while the borrowers 
are not? In these circumstances, the debtor-citizen wants protection and redress from 
the government and wants to be declared free of liability by those who recommended 
the uncomplicated loan to him. The consumer, cradled in his sovereignty and autonomy, 
29 A. Lijphart, Thinking about Democracy: Power Sharing and Majority Rule in Theory and Practice 
(London/New York: Routledge 2008).
30 See U. Reifner and J. Ford (eds.), Banking for People: Social Banking and New Poverty Consumer 
Debts and Unemployment (Berlin/New York: Walter de Gruyter 1992); U. Reifner, Die Geldgesellschaft. 
Aus die Finanzkrise lernen (Wiesbaden: VS Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften 2010).
31 H. Boutellier The Safety Utopia: Contemporary Discontent and Desire as to Crime and Punishment 
(Kluwer Academic Publishers 2004).
32 Posner, above n. 3, at 328: ‘Cassandras rarely receive a fair hearing’ (emphasis added).
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then becomes furious with the rich bankers, who told him he could also become rich on 
the money and capital market, loses his trust in the government, which does not resolve 
this problem for him, and casts a vote for a populist political party.
 It is clear that some key political tensions between autonomy and paternalism are 
neutralised in bankruptcy law. However, consumer protection in the modern credit 
world is both necessary and full of ambiguity on both sides.
9 Concluding Thoughts on the Autonomy-Paternalism Debate: Power, 
Numbers and Social Values
We have seen that the juxtaposition of autonomy and paternalism is not a timeless issue 
and that societal forces have contributed much to its cyclical development. Over time, 
Western societies have looked for an optimal mix of harder and softer mechanism to 
deal with debtors in distress. I consider consumer bankruptcy to be a modern human 
invention, an example of what Schumpeter calls ‘creative destruction’.33 Debts are 
repudiated – or forgiven34 – in order to enable human individuals to go on with their 
lives. One might also hope that this form of limited liability of consumers will also 
nudge commercial creditors to lend money more carefully.
9.1 Autonomy v. Paternalism, or Autonomy v. Heteronomy
Ideally, a contract aims at a win-win situation. Both contracting parties hope to benefi t 
from signing the agreement. Although the death of the contract has been predicted 
repeatedly in the past, contracts are omnipresent and alive and kicking in the real world 
of 2010. Even in the public domain – traditionally the fi eld of public law – all kinds of 
new contractual relations are developing.35
 If a law and economics scholar or a civil law professor looks at a contract, he 
will normally focus on the preferences of the contracting parties. In the autonomous 
paradigm, parties can take care of themselves while carrying out the contract, whereas 
in the paternalistic paradigm one of them needs the help of the state (or the courts). As a 
socio-legal scholar, my interest lies in the societal relationship between the parties and 
the legal institutions that determine such relations. Contract law is socially embedded.
 A contract establishes a relationship between two parties. Because there is often an 
unequal power balance in credit and debt relationships, it is also worthwhile to look 
into the heteronomous dimensions of the contractual debtor-creditor relationship in its 
various stages.
 The distribution of wealth and power in a given society is too important to ignore, 
and the ways of achieving a just distribution is an eternal topic of fi erce political 
debates. Traditionally, labour law and tenant law have been fi elds of private law, where 
the concept of ‘subordination’ has been evolving, because the unequal bargaining power 
of the contracting parties was always obvious.36
 Historically, we have seen a combination of the collectivisation of labour contracts 
via unions and state intervention, and many private labour scholars wonder if these 
fi elds of law still belong to private law or whether they now belong to welfare law.
 Ironically, bankruptcy is also related to distribution – not primarily of wealth but of 
scarcity: the assets of a destitute debtor. Some powerful creditors are in a position to 
evade the effects of the bankruptcy of their clients; others may not be so autonomous. 
The power relationship between creditors should not be ignored in procedural private 
law if society wants to achieve a fair loss distribution.
33 J.A. Schumpeter, Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy (London: George Allan & Unwin 1942).
34 K. Gross, Failure and Forgiveness: Rebalancing the Bankruptcy System (New Haven: Yale University 
Press 1997).
35 I. Harden, The Contracting State (Open University Press 1992).
36 L. Nogler, The Concept of ‘Subordination’ in European and Comparative Law (University of Trento 
Press 2009).
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9.2 Individual and Collective Arrangements
The concepts of autonomy and paternalism seem to date from the period when one-
to-one contractual relationships prevailed in society. In our present mass consumer 
society, a big challenge for private law lies in the handling of the masses and multi-party 
relations. This is where the problems of the ‘asymmetric society’37 arise: information 
surplus on the creditor side, credit score techniques, credit reference innovation and 
commercialisation place the consumer in a dependent and unequal position. The repeat 
players dominate the one-shotters.38
 On the other hand, lawyers have designed mechanisms that create countervailing 
forces that are able to direct masses of claims against big organisations. Mass is power, 
and creative lawyers can translate many individual claims of consumers into a language 
that big business understands and cannot ignore: money. So there is no reason to lament 
about powerless consumers. If they are many and they can organise themselves, we do 
not have to worry very much about their loss of autonomy.
 However, numbers also matter on a smaller scale. Even in an average consumer 
bankruptcy, between ten and twenty creditors are confronted with each other and share 
the problems of enforcing their claims. Talking about the autonomy of the creditor when 
he is part of a multi-party constellation does not deliver many economic results. He is in 
a distributional game with other creditors, who all try to jump the queue.
9.3 Social Values in Substantive and Procedural Civil Law
Advocates of consumer protection have made many intellectual efforts to infuse 
substantive private law with social values. A lot of consumer protection was smuggled 
into the Dutch Civil Code of 1992, and EU Directives introduced protective elements 
into the national civil law systems.
 In the fi eld of credit and debt, Thomas Wilhelmsson has coined the concept of ‘social 
force majeure’ as part of the bigger project of importing ‘welfarism in contract law’.39
 Especially in the fi eld of credit law, we see a perfect culture clash of market values 
and social values. In the market, the debtors that represent a high risk for their creditors 
have to pay high premiums. While tax law in the welfare state is based on the principle 
that ‘the strongest shoulders carry the heaviest burdens’, the market is guided by 
Caplovitz’s law that ‘the poor pay more’.40
 The European Coalition for Responsible Credit (ECRC) promotes ‘productive credit’ 
as the key concept for modern law.41 In this context, the substantive credit contract 
itself must refl ect its life-time character, so that many contractual concepts from one-
spot commercial market transactions do not apply here. Under this approach to contract 
law, consumer bankruptcy (which is part of civil procedural law) comes too late and is 
critically characterised as a means of ‘keeping substantive contract law free from social 
poison’.42
 From my perspective, however, procedural law – which is generally considered to be 
a very dull fi eld of civil law – is an exciting fi eld to explore the autonomy-paternalism 
tension, because it constitutes a battleground for competing claims of all kinds of 
creditors, both among themselves and vis-à-vis their debtors. Bankruptcy is the litmus 
test of the strength and weaknesses of civil obligations and liabilities. All civil law, be it 
substantive or procedural, must have benefi cial consequences for society.
37 J.S. Coleman, The Asymmetric Society (University of Syracuse Press 1982).
38 M. Galanter, ‘Why the “Haves” Come Out Ahead: Speculation on the Limits of Social Change, (1974) 
9 Law & Society Review 95.
39 R. Brownsword, G. Howells and T. Wilhelmsson (eds.), Welfarism in Contract Law (Aldershot: 
Dartmouth 1994).
40 D. Caplovitz, The Poor Pay More: Consumer Practices of Low-Income Families (New York/London: 
Free Press 1967).
41 Niemi, Ramsay and Whitford (2009), above n. 6, at 109 ff.
42 U. Reifner in Niemi-Kiesliainen, Whitford and Ramsay (2003), above n. 6, at 152.

